Public Policy,' paper presented at UBC symposium, August 2001 (http://www.cshc.ubc.ca/viewabstract.php?id=3); Buckner, '"Limited Identities" Revisited.'

31 In this context, the fact that Germany only recently changed its ethnic definition of nationhood into a civic one illustrates the actuality of this issue.

32 Vance's paper on the anti-war novel (see note 7) illustrates in an exemplary form what happens to those who cast doubt on this kind of Sacred Cause.

33 For the debate on Dutch identity see Rob van Ginkel, *Op zoek naar eigenheid: Denkbeelden en discussies over cultuur en identiteit in Nederland* (The Hague: SDU Publishers, 1999). For Swiss identity see Oliver Zimmer, 'In Search of Natural Identity: Alpine Landscape and the Reconstruction of the Swiss Nation,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40 (1998), 637–65.

34 Sebastian Conrad, *Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Nation: Geschichtsschreibung in Westdeutschland und Japan 1945–1960* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999).

35 Lorenz, 'Comparative Historiography.'

Specific Narratives and Schematic Narrative Templates

JAMES V. WERTSCH

As Peter Seixas notes in his introduction to this volume, contemporary analyses of historical consciousness draw on many disciplines and intellectual traditions. These include education, history, memory studies, psychology, and museum studies. This makes for an interesting and lively discussion, but it also presents a challenge when we are trying to find a shared focus. The range of voices is sometimes so wide that it is difficult to know whether they are all involved in the same discussion at all. Motivated by such concerns, Seixas argues for the need to find common and overlapping themes that will facilitate cross-fertilization.

In my view, a topic that presents itself as an excellent candidate in this regard is narrative. Bruner[1] has argued for the need to place narrative at the centre of cultural psychology and the analysis of human consciousness more generally, and scholars in literary studies,[2] psychoanalysis,[3] and the philosophy of history[4] have made similar claims. Such arguments about the importance of narrative for the human sciences apply nowhere more obviously than in the study of collective memory and historical consciousness.

A bold version of the sort of approach I have in mind can be found in Alasdair MacIntyre's assertion that 'man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal.'[5] MacIntyre expands upon this claim by arguing that individuals do not create these stories out of nothing, as if in some kind of totally original, creative act. Instead:

We enter human society ... with one or more imputed characters – roles into which we have been drafted - and we have to learn what they are in order to

be able to understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be construed. It is through hearing stories about wicked stepmothers, lost children, good but misguided kings, wolves that suckle twin boys, youngest sons who receive no inheritance but must make their own way in the world and eldest sons who waste their inheritance on riotous living and go into exile to live with the swine, that children learn or mislearn both what a child and what a parent is, what the cast of characters may be in the drama into which they have been born and what the ways of the world are ... [T]here is no way to give us an understanding of any society, including our own, except through the stock of stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources.[6]

MacIntyre's line of reasoning has several implications when we are thinking about the narrative organization of historical consciousness. The first of these concerns the importance of narrative in general. Like Bruner, MacIntyre stresses that a great deal of thinking, speaking, and other forms of action are fundamentally shaped by narratives. We are especially 'story-telling animals' when it comes to recounting and interpreting our own, and others', actions – the motives that lie behind them, the settings in which they occur, and the outcomes they produce.

Second, MacIntyre stresses that the narrative tools we employ in this connection are provided by the particular cultural, historical, and institutional settings in which we live. Just as Bruner claims that 'symbolic systems ... [are] already in place, already "there," deeply entrenched in culture and language,'[7] MacIntyre sees the narratives we use to make sense of human action as coming from a 'stock of stories' from which any particular individual may draw.

In what follows, I shall examine a particular socio-cultural setting that has been a major source of the stock of stories and cultural tool kits in our world, namely, the modern state. As I have argued elsewhere,[8] modern states have sponsored the most ambitious effort at creating collective memory ever witnessed, and for this reason they deserve special attention. They have particular tendencies and forms of power when it comes to this task. States not only attempt to provide their citizens with official accounts of the past, but they also seek to control the particular ways such accounts are used, as well as access to alternative versions.

In order to address any of these claims concretely, one must begin by trying to clarify what we mean when speaking of 'narrative.' This is a term that is notoriously difficult to pin down, and as a result it has taken on almost as many meanings as there are people using it. Providing a comprehensive review of this issue is a difficult, if not impossible, task and goes well beyond the scope of what I wish to undertake in this chapter. Instead, I shall limit myself to a single major distinction that I believe to be useful when one is trying to understand the role of states in promulgating collective memory: the distinction between 'specific narratives' and 'schematic narrative templates.'

In the terminology I shall employ, specific narratives are the focus of history instruction in schools and deal with 'mid-level' events that populate textbooks, examinations, and other textual forms found in that context. In contrast, schematic narrative templates involve a much more abstract level of representation and provide a narrative framework that is compatible with many instantiations in specific narratives. But let me take up these two levels of narrative analysis in turn.

Specific Narratives

Under the heading of specific narratives I have in mind items such as those MacIntyre lists when he alludes to stories about 'wicked stepmothers, lost children, good but misguided kings,' and the others.[9] These are narratives in the Western tradition that have specific settings, characters, and sequences of events.

Specific narratives can be analysed in terms of the 'episodic' and the 'configurational' dimensions outlined by Ricoeur. The first of these is grounded in chronology and the temporal order and 'characterizes the story insofar as it is made up of events.'[10] In contrast, the second dimension involves emplotment and is what 'transforms the events into a story.'[11] It entails the act that '"grasps together" the detailed actions or ... the story's incidents. It draws from this manifold of events the unity of one temporal whole ... [and] extracts a configuration from a succession.'[12]

The notion of a specific narrative that I shall outline rests squarely on these two dimensions, but it also goes beyond Ricoeur's description in certain respects. Consistent with his account of the episodic dimension, specific narratives involve a temporally ordered set of explicitly mentioned and differentiated events. An additional characteristic of specific narratives is that they are organized around 'mid-level' events.[13] Such events are presented as having specific temporal and spatial boundaries, and the actors are typically groups or particular individuals who act on behalf of, or as leaders of, political collectives. The specific narratives produced by states usually constitute political history. Prototypes can be

found in school textbooks that focus on major events such as wars, revolutions, and other political happenings.

As is often the case with narrative analyses, it is difficult, if not impossible, to pursue this line of reasoning very far by relying solely on abstract categories. For that reason I shall develop my claims about specific narratives and how they differ from schematic narrative templates by using illustrations. These come from a natural laboratory for the study of collective memory and historical consciousness, namely, Russia as it made the transition from Soviet to post-Soviet times. As I have outlined elsewhere,[14] this is a setting that witnessed a transition from strict, centralized control over collective memory to open, if not chaotic, public debate and disagreement. In the years following the break-up of the Soviet Union teachers were confronted with all sorts of proposals for what should be taught as history, and students encountered a host of interpretations of the past, both in and out of school. One of the hallmarks of this period has been that the past is now presented in textbooks and history instruction in ways that differ radically from Soviet practices. Indeed, much of what is presented would have been considered heretical during the Soviet period and discussing such matters publicly would have resulted in severe punishment.

Such radical reinterpretation is evident when one considers episodes such as the 1917 Revolution and the Russian Civil War. Accounts of these events were rewritten such that heroes were turned into villains and vice versa. More important, the events themselves were re-emplotted such that they no longer were triumphs over powerful and evil adversaries. In the post-Soviet rewriting, these events became grand tragedies that could have been averted had actors had more courage and foresight. One important event that has *not* been fundamentally re-emplotted, however, is the Second World War. The most plausible reason for this is that it serves as the 'dominant myth'[15] that continues to be positively viewed in post-Soviet Russia.

The basic plot of this dominant myth involves the treacherous invasion of the homeland by Germany, followed by great suffering and near disaster, followed by triumph against overwhelming odds through Soviet or Russian heroism, and concluding with the expulsion of the German enemy from the homeland and the march to Berlin. This skeletal plot has changed little in the transition to the post-Soviet era. What *has* changed is the identity and characterization of the heroes. Instead of Stalin or the Soviet Communist Party, the story today is formulated such that the masses, especially the Russian masses, are the heroes.

As I have outlined elsewhere,[16] this pattern of retaining the basic plot while changing the heroes of the dominant myth of the Second World War can be found in the official Russian state history as presented in post-Soviet textbooks. It also is reflected in what Russians seem to rely on when asked to speak or write about this war. A fairly standard account of this dominant myth can be found in the following essay written in 1999 by a thirty-five-year-old man from the Siberian city of Novosibirsk. It was written in response to the request to 'write a short essay on the theme: "What was the course of the Second World War from its beginning to end?"'

On September 1, 1939 German forces invaded the territory of Poland.

By the second month they had seized all of Poland. The result of the occupation of Poland was that all of 6 million Poles (30% of the whole population) perished.

In 1940 the seizure of France and the Benelux countries took place.

In 1941 the USSR was attacked. By the end of October 1941 the Germans approached Moscow along a 100-kilometer front. At the price of incredible suffering the Soviet forces were able to throw the Germans back from Moscow at the end of 1941. 1942 was the year of massive resistance. It was the year in which our forces were surrounded at Kharkov and the year of the battle of Stalingrad. The turning point came in 1943. This was the year of the struggle at the Kursk salient, the huge tank battle. In 1944 the second front was opened, and there was a rapid advance toward the west. 1945 saw the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the end of the Second World War.

This text clearly meets the criteria for Ricoeur's episodic dimension in that it lists several differentiated and temporally organized events. As is the case for subjects from various studies that colleagues and I have conducted over the past several years, this essay writer separates the beginning of the Second World War (September 1939) from the beginning of the Great Patriotic War (22 June 1941). It is clear from his account that the major story to be told, in his view, has to do with the latter. There is a basic set of events that appear repeatedly in Soviet and post-Soviet textbooks and other official accounts, as well as in subjects' essays and interviews about the Second World War. As is the case for this subject, other events also appear, but the following core events of the Great Patriotic War must appear in any official account:

- German invasion of USSR on 22 September 1941
- Battle of Moscow, winter of 1941–2

- Battle of Stalingrad, winter of 1942–3
- Soviet victory over German army and the march to Berlin and victory, May 1945

The fact that this thirty-five-year-old subject structured his narrative around these basic events is not surprising, given that he had received his education and lived much of his life in the Soviet system. It is worth noting, however, that he also included a few 'post-Sovietisms.' For example, he made note of specific groups, namely Poles, as opposed to the Soviet people, who were at the heart of official history in the Soviet era.

For my present purposes, however, the most important point is that this individual included the four basic events that had to be included in an official account of either the Soviet or post-Soviet period. These are mid-level events in that they have specific temporal and spatial boundaries and involve concrete collective actors. Furthermore, taken together, they form an identifiable plot and hence reflect the configurational, as well as episodic, dimensions of narrative.

Schematic Narrative Templates

One of the most striking findings to emerge from the study of collective memory for the Second World War in Russia is the difference between generations who grew up and attended school during the Soviet era ('Soviet generations'), on the one hand, and those who did so in the post-Soviet era ('post-Soviet generation'), on the other. This difference is usually characterized in terms of how little the post-Soviet generation knows about the past. Strikingly, older Russians routinely complain, 'The younger generation knows nothing about history these days.'

At first glance, empirical findings suggest that this assessment has much to recommend it. Individuals in the post-Soviet generation were generally unable to provide the sort of specific narratives about the Second World War that were readily available to older people. The difference was so great that members of Soviet-educated generations are often appalled at the paucity and inaccuracy of details in the post-Soviet generation's account of the war. They view many of the younger people's accounts as pathetic, laughable, and even blasphemous.

As an example of the sort of account provided by members of the post-Soviet generation, consider the following essay written by a fifteen-year-old boy from Moscow in 2000:

The beginning [of the war] was very unexpected for the whole world except for Hitler. Also unexpected was the massive amount of bloodshed, the human losses, the Fascist concentration camps. The emergence of a second Napoleon, Adolf Hitler, was also unexpected and strange. The course of the war was hard for the countries of the defenders. Terrible, hard, bloody.

The difference between this account and the one outlined earlier is striking. And if anything, this difference understates the case when we consider the difference between the Soviet and post-Soviet generations. Many members of Soviet generations provided much longer and more elaborate accounts of the Second World War than the one I reported above, while many members of the post-Soviet generation provided much shorter accounts (some saying they didn't know and therefore could not respond at all). Furthermore, the younger subjects often made mistakes that virtually never appeared in older subjects' responses.

Such striking, systematic differences between the generational groups' accounts of the war indeed seem to support the older group's dismissal of younger Russians as not knowing anything about the past. More generally, I have argued that such differences support the view that the post-Soviet Russian state largely lost control of collective memory, at least temporarily.[17]

This interpretation, however, is unsatisfactory because it provides only a negative characterization of the post-Soviet generation. In this view, the younger subjects are understood solely in terms of the standards they are not living up to, the implication being that they were trying to do the same thing as older Russians, but were simply less good at it. In fact, members of the post-Soviet generation often included items in their accounts that never appeared in those of older subjects, which suggests they were doing something distinct from their older counterparts.

It is in this connection that the notion of schematic narrative templates becomes useful. It provides a means for understanding differences as well as commonalities between the two generations. As understood here, the notion of a schematic narrative template can be traced to several sources. One of the most important is the Russian folklorist Vladimir Propp.[18] In developing his line of reasoning about Russian folk tales, Propp argued for the need to focus on the generalized 'functions' that characterize a broad range of narratives, as opposed to the particular events and actors that occur in specific ones. From this perspective, 'recurrent constants' or functions 'of dramatis personae are

basic components of the tale.'[19] This focus on abstract function means that several specific events and individuals may fit under the heading of a particular function in a narrative. In this view, '*Functions of characters serve as stable, constant elements of a tale, independent of how and by whom they are fulfilled.*'[20]

Propp identified an extensive network of generalized functions, including items such as 'THE VILLAIN RECEIVES INFORMATION ABOUT HIS VICTIM' and 'THE VILLAIN IS DEFEATED.'[21] From my perspective, the primary value of Propp's ideas about narrative functions concerns his general line of reasoning rather than his detailed claims (developed in connection with Russian folk tales) about particular functions. Specifically, I am concerned with the notion that a generalized narrative form underlies a range of specific narratives in a cultural tradition. This viewpoint changes the focus from analysing a list of specific narratives to analysing an underlying pattern that may be instantiated in any one of several ways.

If we switch from folklore to psychology, an analogous line of reasoning may be found in the writings of Frederic Bartlett.[22] His classic book *Remembering* spawned a host of research efforts that continue to this day in the psychology of memory. Although there is no reason to assume that he was familiar with Propp's writings, Bartlett did develop some similar claims. In his view, human cognitive functioning is usually more of a 'constructive' process[23] than a product of stimuli, and this belief led him to examine the generalized patterns or 'schemata' brought to this process by the agent doing the constructing.

Bartlett took as a starting point for his inquiry the assumption that one can 'speak of every human cognitive reaction – perceiving, imagining, remembering, thinking and reasoning – as an *effort after meaning.*'[24] This effort is grounded in 'tendencies which the subject brings with him into the situation with which he is called upon to deal.' Bartlett discussed these tendencies in terms of 'schemes' that are 'utilised so as to make [the subject's] reaction the "easiest," or the least disagreeable, or the quickest and least obstructed that is at the time possible.'[25] He also noted that these schemes are often used in a 'completely unreflective, unanalytical and unwitting manner.'[26]

Bartlett's general line of reasoning continues to have a powerful impact on memory research in psychology to this day. An example of this influence can be seen in the writings of Michael Ross[27] on 'implicit theories.' Ross is concerned with the formation of autobiographical memory, which is 'depicted as an active, constructive, schema-guided

process.'[28] Like many psychologists of memory, Ross assumes that remembering is typically not very accurate with regard to details. Instead, he sees the construction of personal histories as being shaped by a host of biasing factors, including implicit theories. In this account, '[i]mplicit theories are schemalike knowledge structures that include specific beliefs.'[29] Furthermore, '[t]hese theories are implicit in that they encompass rarely discussed, but strongly held beliefs.'[30]

The writings of Propp, Bartlett, and Ross contribute different elements of an understanding of schematic narrative templates. The main point is that narrative templates are schematic in the sense that they concern abstract, generalized functions of the sort that Propp discussed in his structural analysis of folk tales and that Bartlett and Ross discuss under the heading of 'schemalike knowledge structures.' These involve narrative, a point that is explicit in Propp's writings and consistent with what Bartlett and Ross propose. And the notion of template implies that these abstract structures can underlie several different specific narratives, each of which has a particular setting, cast of characters, dates, and so forth. This viewpoint suggests that collective memory comprises not a long list of specific narratives about the past as separate items, but a cultural tool kit that includes a few basic building blocks.

The writings of Propp, Bartlett, and Ross suggest a few additional properties worth keeping in mind when we deal with schematic narrative templates. First, they are not some sort of universal archetypes. Instead, they belong to particular narrative traditions that can be expected to differ from one cultural setting to another. Second, narrative templates are not readily available to conscious reflection. As Bartlett noted, they are used in an 'unreflective, unanalytical and unwitting manner,'[31] and according to Ross, they are 'rarely discussed.'[32]

In the case of the Russian texts about the Second World War that are of concern here, the particular schematic narrative template involved can be termed the 'triumph-over-alien-forces' narrative. This is a narrative template that may be instantiated using a range of concrete characters, events, dates, and circumstances, but its basic plot remains relatively constant and contains the following items:

- an 'initial situation'[33] in which the Russian people are living in a peaceful setting where they are no threat to others is disrupted by
- the initiation of trouble or aggression by an alien force, or agent, which leads to
- a time of crisis, great suffering, and almost total defeat, which is

- overcome by the triumph over the alien force by the Russian people, acting heroically and alone

To many it will appear that there is nothing peculiarly Russian about this narrative template. It may be found just about anywhere. For example, if we replace 'Russian' with 'American,' the template would seem to provide a foundation for American collective memory of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. My claim is not that this particular narrative template is available *only* to members of the Russian narrative tradition or that this is the only schematic narrative template in this tradition. Obviously, this is a cultural tool employed by many people around the world. However, there are some points that suggest that this template plays a particularly important role and takes on a particular form in the Russian narrative tradition and hence in collective remembering.

The first of these concerns its ubiquity. Whereas the United States and many other societies have accounts of past events that fit this narrative template, it seems to be employed more widely in the Russian tradition than elsewhere. It forms the basic plot line for several of the most important events in Russian history, including the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, the Swedish invasion in the eighteenth century, Napoleon's invasion in the nineteenth, and Hitler's invasion in the twentieth century. Indeed, many would say that this narrative template is *the* underlying story of Russian collective remembering, and hence contrasts with the narratives that people from other nations might employ. For example, it contrasts with the American 'mystique of Manifest Destiny'[34] or 'quest for freedom' narrative.[35]

Of course, one obvious reason for the ubiquity of this narrative template in Russian collective remembering is that it reflects actual experience. Over its history Russia clearly has been the victim of several invasions and other acts of aggression, and my intent is not to argue that this narrative is without foundation. Instead, it is to examine how this narrative template is organized and how it plays a role in shaping new accounts of the past.

Returning to the two texts provided above, there is evidence that the triumph-over-alien-forces schematic narrative template is at work in both cases. The thirty-five-year-old's account positions the USSR as being the victim of an unexpected and uncalled-for attack and then goes on to talk about throwing back the Germans 'at the price of incredible suffering' by the Soviet forces. It then lists other major battles that eventuated in a 'rapid advance toward the west' and the end of the war in Europe. In

short, this is a specific narrative built around concrete, mid-level events, all of which are organized or motivated by the triumph-over-alien-forces schematic narrative template.

On the face of it, the fifteen-year-old's account of the war looks completely different. It is not a specific narrative built out of mid-level events. Instead, the items mentioned involve either unique personalities (Hitler) or general observations that hardly qualify as events at all ('the massive amount of bloodshed, the human losses, the Fascist concentration camps'). So few specific events are included here that there is little to the episodic dimension of the narrative. And without that dimension it is difficult to know what the configurational dimension would be. It is precisely such texts by the post-Soviet generation that lead their older Russian counterparts to shake their heads and say this generation knows nothing about history.

On the other hand, this fifteen-year-old includes some items in his text that were never found in those of the older subjects. Of particular interest is his mention of 'a second Napoleon, Adolf Hitler,' something not mentioned in older subjects' essays. For someone from the United States, Canada, or many other countries, the reason for including this comment is difficult to fathom. The juxtaposition of Napoleon and Hitler in this young man's text is probably something that Westerners seldom, if ever, have encountered. It is something, however, with which both the Soviet and the post-Soviet generations of Russians are familiar. Indeed, it was included in a few other essays by post-Soviet subjects.

What did this young man have in mind, then, when he included this reference in his essay? The answer is to be found in the schematic narrative template that he and others of his generation use when trying to provide an account of the Second World War. Even though he cannot provide a detailed specific narrative about the events of the war, like many others in the post-Soviet generation, he continues to use the triumph-over-alien-forces schema. While he may not be able to provide the standard fare of dates and mid-level events found in older subjects' accounts, he can emphasize the general plot involved in his account. It is as if he can provide the configurational, but not the episodic, dimension of a narrative about the Second World War. He does this by suggesting the plot is the familiar one that has applied to many previous episodes in Russian history. The names, faces, events, and dates may change, but the basic outline of the story is available in template form, as he suggests by calling Hitler the 'second Napoleon.'

This idea that the Second World War is another version of the same

basic story that Russia has encountered time and again in its history reflects this post-Soviet subject's reliance on the triumph-over-alien-forces schematic narrative template. Other young subjects used other devices to come up with accounts that reflect the same basic pattern. As with their older counterparts, the triumph-over-alien-forces narrative template guided their efforts, but unlike them, the younger subjects often could rely on little other than this narrative template.

What this comparison suggests is that the generational transition at issue is one that involves striking change as well as underlying continuity. If we take essays such as the ones I have provided above as reflecting collective memory of the Second World War, then there are grounds for saying that this memory has undergone a radical change over the past decade or two. Such is the assessment of people who complain that the younger generation in Russia no longer knows anything about history. Yet if we consider that the post-Soviet generation is relying on the same basic schematic narrative template as the older subjects did, then there is reason to assert that little has changed in collective memory in this setting.

Conclusion

My general purpose in this chapter is not to provide details about the specific narratives and schematic narrative templates unique to Soviet or post-Soviet Russia. This is a task that I have taken up elsewhere, and it is a topic that deserves much more attention in the future. Instead, my purpose is to introduce the distinction between two different levels of narrative organization and demonstrate the need to recognize this distinction in discussions of historical consciousness and collective memory. It will not do to speak simply of the narrative organization of collective memory. If we leave it at that, we would have no means for understanding the striking differences, *and* underlying continuities, that characterize generational transitions in collective memories, such as those of the Second World War in Russia.

I suspect that similar issues underlie many of our discussions about other areas of collective memory and historical consciousness. While it may be the case that narrative can provide an important theme that can rein in centrifugal tendencies in the discussions about these phenomena, confusion will continue to surface if we do not have a way of distinguishing between specific narratives involving mid-level events, on the one hand, and schematic narrative templates, on the other.

Notes

1 Jerome S. Bruner, *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

2 R. Scholes and R. Kellogg, *The Nature of Narrative* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).

3 Roy Schafer, 'Narration in the Psychoanalytic Dialogue,' in W.J.T. Mitchell, ed., *On Narrative* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 25–49.

4 Louis O. Mink, 'Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument,' in R.H. Canary and H. Kozicki, eds, *The Writing of History: Literary Form and Historical Understanding* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 129–49; Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

5 Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 216.

6 Ibid., 216.

7 Jerome S. Bruner, *Acts of Meaning* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 11.

8 James V. Wertsch, *Voices of Collective Remembering* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

9 MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 216.

10 Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 3 vols, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1: 66.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Wertsch, *Voices of Collective Remembering*.

14 Ibid.

15 A. Weiner, 'The Making of a Dominant Myth. The Second World War and the Construction of Political Identities with the Soviet Polity,' *The Russian Review* 55 (1996): 638–60.

16 The following is based on research explored in Wertsch, *Voices of Collective Remembering*.

17 Ibid.

18 Vladimir Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale*, trans. Laurence Scott (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968).

19 Ibid., 21.

20 Ibid., 21; italics in the original.

21 Ibid., 28, 53; capitals in the original.
22 Frederic C. Bartlett, *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; first published 1932).
23 Ibid., 312.
24 Ibid., 44
25 Ibid., 44.
26 Ibid., 45.
27 Michael Ross, 'Relation of Implicit Theories to the Construction of Personal Histories,' *Psychological Review* 96, no. 2 (1989): 341–57.
28 Ibid., 341–2.
29 Ibid., 342.
30 Ibid.
31 Bartlett, *Remembering*, 45.
32 Ross, 'Relation of Implicit Theories,' 342.
33 Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale*, 26.
34 David Lowenthal, 'Identity, Heritage, and History,' in John R. Gillis, ed., *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 41–57.
35 James V. Wertsch, 'Struggling with the Past: Some Dynamics of Historical Representation,' in Mario Carretero and James F. Voss, eds, *Cognitive and Instructional Processes in History and the Social Sciences* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994), 323–38; James V. Wertsch and Kevin O'Connor, 'Multivoicedness in Historical Representation: American College Students' Accounts of the Origins of the US,' *Journal of Narrative and Life History* 4, no. 4 (1994): 295–310.

Historical Consciousness: Narrative Structure, Moral Function, and Ontogenetic Development[1]

JÖRN RÜSEN

> Question: What comes immediately into your mind, when you think history?
> Answer: Today will tomorrow be yesterday.[2]

A Narrative in Four Variations

The ancient castle of Col is located in the highlands of Scotland. It is the ancestral residence of the chiefs of the Maclean clan and is still in the possession of a member of the Maclean family, who lives in the castle. On the wall is a stone engraved with the following inscription: *If any man of the clan of Maclonich shall appear before this castle, though he come at midnight, with a man's head in his hand, he shall find here safety and protection against all.*

This text is from an old Highlands treaty concluded upon a highly memorable occasion. In the distant past, one of the Maclean forefathers obtained a grant of the lands of another clan from the Scottish king; that clan had forfeited its land by giving offence to the king. Maclean proceeded with an armed force of men to take possession of his new lands, accompanied by his wife. In the ensuing confrontation and battle with the other clan, Maclean was defeated and lost his life. His wife fell into the hands of the victors, and was found pregnant with child. The chief of the victorious clan transferred the pregnant Lady Maclean to the custody of the Maclonich family with a specific stipulation: if the child born should be a boy, it was to be killed immediately; if a girl, the baby should

Theorizing Historical Consciousness

Edited by Peter Seixas

2004